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Sergio J. Campos
Ian Ayres and Joe Bankman begin one of their articles with a Dilbert cartoon (reproduced below). They use the
cartoon to show that firm insiders may use nonpublic information to trade not only their own company stock,
but the stock of competitors, rivals, and suppliers. Ayres and Bankman ultimately conclude that insider trading
of such stock substitutes is inefficient and should be prohibited, but they acknowledge the argument that insider
trading may "produce more accurate stock prices." Presumably one could learn a lot about a company by paying
attention to how its insiders treat substitutes for the company's stock.
DILBERT 01996 Scott Adams. Used By permission of UNIVERSAL UCLICK. All rights reserved.
Robert L. Jones has written an excellent article that examines one insider's views of a substitute for judicial
review under the Constitution-James Madison, who is arguably the "father" of the Constitution. (P. 5.) The
substitute was a proposed Council of Revision, endorsed by Madison as part of the Virginia Plan. It was
ultimately rejected at the Constitutional Convention, but Jones argues that one can learn a great deal about our
current practice of judicial review by examining the reasons Madison preferred it over the type of judicial
review we have today.
As proposed, the Council of Revision granted a qualified veto over all legislation passed by Congress to the
President and "a convenient number of the National Judiciary," who would all come from the Supreme Court.
(P. 28.) The veto was qualified because a supermajority of Congress could override it. A Council of Revision
was by no means unprecedented. New York had established one at the time of the Convention, and the proposed
Council was most likely modeled on the British Privy Council. (P. 28 n. 105.) The proposed Council was not
limited to reviewing the constitutionality of enacted legislation; as Jones makes clear, Madison contemplated
that it would veto legislation on both policy and constitutional grounds.
Why did Madison prefer a Council of Revision to judicial review? Here Jones notes the distinction that Madison
made between "democratic legitimacy on the one hand and rationality and deliberation on the other." (P. 20.)
Like his contemporaries, Madison was concerned with the costs of rule by popular sentiment. In his view, the
main defect of the Articles of Confederation was that it allowed the states to engage in conduct that, while
popular, produced self-defeating results. Thus, he included and endorsed features in the Constitution that
checked popular sentiment, such as establishing a representative government where the representatives would,
ideally, "lead and shape, rather than simply slavishly follow, popular sentiment." (Id.) Moreover, and as made
famous by Federalist No. 10, Madison believed that the vast extent of the United States would make it hard for
any one faction to come to power and subordinate the interests of others.
Nevertheless, Madison was concerned with the "vortex" of power that Congress could become, and he was
skeptical that a veto by the president alone would ever be exercised. He thus concluded that granting a qualified
veto to two branches - the executive and some portion of the judiciary - would make it easier for both together
to wield a veto that would be seen as legitimate by the people.
When the Constitutional Convention ultimately rejected the Council, Madison threw his support behind a Bill of
Rights to supplement judicial review. This seems odd because Madison had previously opposed a Bill of Rights
out of a fear that the Rights would be unduly narrowed through judicial interpretation.
Why did he change his mind? There are a number of cynical reasons proposed by historians - to circumvent
more radical changes proposed by the antifederalists or to win a Congressional seat. But Jones argues that
Madison saw the Bill of Rights as a way to lend popular support to judicial review. Madison surmised that a Bill
of Rights would be internalized by the people, who would then view the judiciary as "the guardian of those
rights." (P. 99.) Although Madison did not believe that judicial review coupled with a Bill of Rights would gain
the same popular support as a Council of Revision, he was enough of a pragmatist to realize that it was the best
he could do.
This is a wonderful article and a joy to read. Its best feature, in my view, is how Jones uses this history of
Madison's failed attempt to enact a Council of Revision. One could imagine a legal scholar using this history to
support an originalist argument about the nature of judicial review. But Jones avoids this trap, perhaps
recognizing that he view of one founding father (no matter how important) is probably too slender a reed to rest
any inferences about what all the founding fathers intended.
Instead, Jones considers the normative lessons of Madison's failed attempt. Jones suggests that we could learn a
great deal from Madison's pragmatic concerns about democracy. The biggest lesson is that we should not equate
democracy with majoritarian rule. Madison's proposed Council of Revision, which would have been able to
veto legislation on policy grounds, demonstrates that Madison did not view the judiciary as providing an
antidemocratic check. Instead, he viewed the judiciary as performing a crucial democratic function by
introducing deliberation and rationality to lawmaking, separated from the passions that drive normal politics.
The judiciary was the superego to the legislature's id. In fact, Madison envisioned that the id still could trump
the superego because the Council's veto could be overturned by a supermajority in Congress.
Moreover, and as Jones discusses, Madison's proposal suggests that the countermajoritarian difficulty should
mean something different entirely. Madison did not believe that the judiciary lacked a democratic justification
to make decisions that countered the majority because, again, he did not equate democracy with majoritarian
rule. Instead, he was concerned with the all-too-human side of judging - that a judge will be too weak-willed to
stand up to public sentiment, no matter how wrongheaded that sentiment may be. For Madison, the difficulty
was setting up a governmental structure in which the majority will not riot when judges do their job. This
difficulty is not unlike the difficulty of getting yourself to stick to a diet when confronted with a donut. Self-
governance, both at an individual level and at a societal level, requires one to think of clever ways to get oneself
to do the right thing.
Certainly some of Madison's views have not survived the test of time. Congress is the least opular branch, not
the most popular. But Madison was probably right about the problem of getting the American people to eat their
vegetables, so to speak, and it would be wise for us to take these concerns more seriously. If anything, Jones'
article reminds us of the importance of listening to our elders. They know a thing or two.
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